Debates about the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007 have pointed at institutional and individual-behavioural factors as its causes. Using the British Household Panel Survey, this paper highlights marked differences in perceptions of societal and economic fairness among financial services employees in investment or management positions in the UK, and the general working population at the brink of the GFC. Panel data analysis suggests that financial services and occupations did not necessarily attract employees with pro-market attitudes, but that employment in these institutions and occupations made it more likely that employees came to display these perceptions, contributing to the construction of a distinct attitudinal profile of finance employees.
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Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that started in 2007 triggered a very public soul-searching in Europe and the USA as to who may need to bear responsibility for the manifest economic and fiscal calamities brought about by a collapsing and bailed-out banking sector. Early culprits included the banking institutions themselves, including mainstream banks and their highly paid chief executives, but also hedge funds and other shadow banking operators. For some, the GFC came about as a result of lack of oversight or due diligence, loose monetary policy especially in the United States, and irresponsible lending practices (Cassidy 2009 ). For others, the root cause was the financialisation of economies that helped to spread these lending practices worldwide (Freeman 2010) ; unsustainable and irresponsible credit-seeking by, and lending to, increasingly indebted private consumers (Hamnett 2009 ); the erosion of faith in debt-driven national economies (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) ; excessive incentives and the rent-seeking behaviour of financial elites (Hodgson et al. 2010 ); or indeed flawed economic theories (UN 2009 ). This list is not exhaustive, and none of the above interpretations are necessarily mutually exclusive. As of late, however, the public discourse has settled for blaming the public and, notably, the public sector of countries affected by the GFC, many of which had only just rescued the private banking sector from collapse (Blyth 2014 ).
The puzzle remains as to whether institutions or individuals and their reckless behaviour brought down the global economy so soon after the last crisis of the 'dot-com' industry in 2001. Typically, explorations of the role of individuals in economic crises have focussed on top-level 'wheelers-and-dealers', on the power and influence of the super-rich (Armstrong 2010) , those who mistakenly thought they were geniuses (Lowenstein 2002) or the 'smartest guys in the room' (McLean & Elkind 2004 ) that could set no foot wrong; and on the 'rogue' elements in the sector.
This paper widens the net to take a look at the attitudes towards social and economic issues prevalent among 'average' bankers and financial executives in the UK in the years leading up to the GFC. Drawing on longitudinal survey data, the paper analyses social preferences and perceptions of people working in financial occupations in the UK and compares them to other populations. Collectively, those working in financial occupations will be referred to as 'financial services employees', or FSE.
Specifically, the paper examines, first, the extent to which social perceptions and attitudes among the UK's FSE at the start of the crisis differed from those of the British population at large. The analysis seeks to shed a little more light on the validity of 'blaming' excessive risk-taking and 'greed' for the GFC: were FSE's attitudes towards risk, money, or economic principles really that different from the rest of the working population to warrant singling out the former as possible perpetrators of crisis-inducing behaviour?
Second, the study exploits the availability of longitudinal survey data to test the association between social perceptions on the one hand, and job duration, that is, extended exposure to working in financial services occupations, on the other. Specifically, this will allow some judgement as to whether working in finance amplifies social orientations in ways not observed among other populations. The analysis will also ask whether financial services occupations attract employees with social orientation that are already different from those of the working population at large. In other words, if we were to find distinct or distinctly prominent social attitudes among FSE, is that because people with such social perceptions self-select into financial services occupations or because working in these occupations leads FSE to acquire such perceptions?
Empirically confirming one or both effects has significant implications for our understanding and ability of explain the GFC in terms of individualised-behavioural or structural, institutional models. In the following section, key features of these two models are reviewed, before turning to presenting, first, the data and, then, the analysis and its findings.
Overview of the literature
This section is divided into two parts, commencing with a review of the literature purporting 'individualistic' interpretations of the crisis, which is followed by a review of the corporateinstitutional interpretations of the origins of the GFC. Not all authors who examined the roots of the GFC hold the view that uncontrolled, irresponsible individual behaviour was to blame for the crisis. Rajan (2010: 121) notes that business people's 'willingness to exploit any advantages that will help them make money… stems partly from the nature of competitive banking…and partly from the way banker performance is measured'. Similarly, Tett (2009: x) argues that '(t)he story of the great credit boom and bust is not a saga that can be neatly blamed on a few greedy or evil individuals'.
Individual-behavioural theories of the crisis in the making
The real issue was 'the finance world's lack of interest in wider social matters' (Tett 2009: 298) , its misguided belief in the infallibility of mathematical models (ibid: 299), a lack of top managerial control over traders (ibid: 156) and the disregard that investment traders paid to their management colleagues (ibid: 186) who were ultimately responsible for internal risk management. public opinion increasingly turned away from supporting the redistribution of wealth (Georgiadis & Manning 2007) . The 'triumph of the city' (Lee 2007: 88) , however, could not prevent the return of economic bust. Danger signs were spotted early, as, for instance, in Munro et al (2005) . This study highlighted the risks of subprime lending to housing in the UK.
Structural explanations
Remarkably, its warnings appear to have been barely noted at the time.
In the United States, subprime mortgaging had been driven by misleading, if not falsified information provided by mortgage sellers to home buyers about asset values (Piskorki et al 2013) . These lending practices exposed banks to assets of questionable, indeterminable value, whilst these same banks lacked the assets to balance the risk of financial loss. Credit rating agencies did little to alert banks or the public to the rapidly growing risk of 'progressive illiquidity' of a financial system increasingly reliant on imaginary finance and speculation (Nesvetailova 2008 (Alfon et al 2004) . As this regulatory influence vaned, so did the amount of 'real' money retained by the speculating banks.
Making a connection
Individualist and structural explanations for the crisis are not mutually exclusive and can be used to inform each other. Individual misdemeanour or corporate malfeasance, for instance, are easily condoned when they are alleged to be the result of some inescapable, if inconvenient, competitive or regulatory force. Disregarding rules then becomes institutionally permissible as illustrated in a review of conditions at Barclay's Bank in the wake and aftermath of the Libor scandal (Salz 2013) . It found that, after two decades of corporate growth, the bank had 'no common purpose' and no 'shared values' (Salz 2013: 6-7) , and demonstrated a lack of corporate leadership. A lack of corporate oversight had allowed investment traders' 'animal instincts' to take charge, encouraged by their generous financial rewards, which 'contributed significantly to a sense among a few that they were somehow unaffected by the ordinary rules' (Salz 2013: 9) . With hindsight, the influence of both organisational structure and individual agency in the construction of the banking crisis appeared obvious.
The question of the role of bonus payments in the GFC has recently moved off the political and public agenda, despite evidence that they did much to distort the lending market in the run up to the GFC. Agarwal and Wang (2009) , for instance, found that incentive packages increased small business loan approvals by an unnamed major commercial bank by 47 per cent and, tragically, the default rate by 24 per cent. In London's financial district, as already noted, salaries and bonuses were the most important motivation for professionals working in financial services (St Paul's Institute 2011).
Vested interests also shaped the political response to the GFC in the UK as Government commissions charged with reviewing the banking sector in the wake of the crisis were headed by individuals with close connections to the financial sector (CRESC 2009).
Independent voices, in particular of those critical of the business and political elite, appeared excluded (Froud et al. 2011 ). This 'democratic disconnect' (ibid.) may well have served to protect the financial sector, as the thus generated exclusivity by virtue of exclusion perpetuated difference that eventually consolidated the status quo (Khan 2012 ).
The present study lends some support to the plausibility of this thesis as it highlights a marked dissonance between the social perceptions of those working in managerial or investment positions in the financial services, whose voices have been most clearly heard and listened to before and after the onset of the GFC, compared with those in other occupations and sectors.
Data sources and preparation
The study used data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a longitudinal survey of households in Britain (and more recently also including Northern Ireland) that commenced in 1991 and continues to the present day with an increased sample and now known as 'Understanding Society'. The BHPS covers about 5,000 households and some 10,000 individuals, recording household characteristics and changes, labour market experiences, a broad range of social and social justice attitudes, including risk perceptions, and voting preferences and behaviours. It also gathers information on occupations, income and earnings, and bonus payments.
The BHPS sample has been updated since its inception to allow for attrition and households entering or leaving the panel. Longitudinal and cross-sectional weights are available to enhance the representativeness of the datasets for the UK population. 
Case identification
The BHPS data include variables identifying current and past occupations of panel members.
For the present study, we used the UK Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 1990 for data pertaining to the year 2001 to identify those working in the financial services sector. For later years, the UK SOC 2000 was used. Every effort was made to match sub-major and major level categories, drawing on ONS (2000) and ONS (2006) .
The case identification distinguished between two main groups of FSE, who, for ease and brevity of description will be referred to as investment and management (or managerial) 
Bonus payment
Since 1997 (wave G), the BHPS has recorded whether, in the previous 12 months, respondents had 'received any bonuses such as a Christmas or quarterly bonus, profit-related pay or profit sharing bonus, or an occasional commission'. Those who had were then asked about the total amount of bonus payments received during that period, and whether the amount was before or after tax. Each year, around 90 per cent of those who had indicated they had received a bonus payment also provided the amount. In combination with earnings data also reported in the BHPS, this information was used to estimate the share of bonus payments as of total earnings. All monetary values used in this study were inflated to 2008 GB Pounds using CPI data.
Attitudes and Opinions
The BHPS contains a range of social and political attitude questions that survey respondents have been asked in different waves. Most of these questions have been included in several, but not consecutive waves of the BHPS. The sole notable exception are questions on voting behaviour, which had been included in all waves.
The present study focussed on a sub-set of recently asked questions that allowed testing for socio-cultural differences between FSE and other sections of the working population. It analysed responses to questions eliciting attitudes towards money and risk taking; about social trust and social justice. The measures pertaining to social justice allowed respondents to express agreement or disagreement with a range of statements often fundamental to underlying social and economic beliefs, including in the efficiency and equitable nature of the market economy, and its effectiveness in sharing outputs.
The exact wording of the questions and associated answer options was as follows:
The importance of money 
Profiling financial services employees
This section starts with a description of the socio-demographic characteristics of those working in higher level financial occupations in the UK based on BHPS data for 2008. This is followed by summaries of the findings from statistical tests of differences in social attitudes among employees in financial service occupations and others in the workforce. Using multivariate regression, the analyses controlled for a range of socio-demographic and other characteristics that are explained below.
All analyses focussed on individuals in employment at the expense of those temporarily or permanently outside the labour market. This helped the study to focus on examining the influence of continuous employment with an organisation on socio-cultural values. Unless otherwise indicated, only statistically significant results are reported.
Socio-Demographics
For the analysis of socio-demographics, we used cross-sectional data from the 2008 BHPS. In that year, investment and management FSE each accounted for about 1.2 per cent of employees in employment in that year. 1 In both FSE groups only about half were employed in the financial services sector (45 per cent), while almost a quarter was working in production (23 per cent), one fifth in private services other than the financial sector (19 per cent) and the remainder was employed in public services (13 per cent).
Employees in financial services occupations differed from others in employment on a range of characteristics. Although there were no statistically significant differences in the mean ages, FSE tended to concentrate in the two lower age categories of those aged 26-35 or aged 36-45 (Table 1) . FSE were more likely to be married and to have at least undergraduate qualifications. On average, they had spent fewer years (3.9) with their current employer than others had (5). They were more likely to have received a bonus payment in the previous 12 months, and these bonus payments tended to be significantly higher in that year and but also when summed over the previous five years (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . FSE had received bonus payments more often during that period than others had. FSE were also more likely to be living in London These statistics again demonstrate this study's concern not with top bonus earners in financial occupations whose reported bonus income can equate to several multiples of the amounts reported here. Instead, the study is concerned with the occupational average. The probability that the elite of very high-bonus earning FSE would be captured in a social survey is very small indeed. This said, the study identified a distinct group of high earners in finance whose income would have ranked them in the top percentile of all earners in the UK at the time.
Attitudes and Opinions
Whilst FSE were, on average, higher earners, their attitudes to money or risk were not dissimilar to those of the rest of the working population. For instance, 27 per cent of FSE and 31 per cent of others in employment and interviewed in 2008 considered it important to have money (measured as rated 8 or higher on the 10-point scale) (Table 2) . Similarly, 20 per cent of FSE and 18 per cent of others in employment considered themselves willing to take risks (rated 8 or higher). In neither case were the nominal differences statistically significant. Thus, FSE were more likely than others to agree that 'ordinary people get a fair share of the nation's wealth' (27 per cent versus 14 per cent) and that 'private enterprise is the best way to solve the UK's economic problems' (40 per cent; 18 per cent). FSE thus indicated a stronger than otherwise typical belief in the fairness of the current economic system and a preference for market-based approach to economic development. The latter was also reflected in FSE's lower propensity to support the view that public services should be state owned (30 per cent; 34 per cent), or that government had an obligation to provide jobs (24 per cent; 38 per cent). Conversely, FSE were less likely to believe that 'there was one law for the rich, and one for the poor' (37 per cent; 58 per cent), suggesting a stronger belief in the fairness of the current system of legal and social justice.
Differences were also again apparent between the opinions of investment and management FSE. Here, management FSE more frequently expressed non-interventionist, pro-market values than their investment FSE peers. They were more likely to agree with the statement that private enterprise would solve the UK's economic problem (53 per cent versus 28 per cent), but less convinced that the government should be expected to provide jobs for people 15 per cent; 33 per cent). They were also less likely to believe that trade unions protected working conditions and wages (45 per cent; 63 per cent).
Cross-sectional logistic regression
These relationships or lack thereof also held after controlling for socio-demographic and employment characteristics. Cross-sectional logistical regression analyses, which, for space reasons, cannot be described in detail here, highlighted sex and age as key factors associated with most attitudes and perceptions examined here. Furthermore, whereas no independent statistical relationships were found between FSE status and the importance attached to money or to self-perceptions as risk takers, trust and social justice perceptions remained independently associated with FSE status.
Social attitudes, self-selection and employment
Having established that FSE expressed social values and preferences that were different from those of other employees, we are left with exploring how these orientations relate to employment in financial services occupations or the financial services sector. The remainder of the paper examines whether people with the given attitudes were particularly likely to be working and especially likely to choose to be working in these occupations or sector, or whether working in these occupations or sector made it more likely that someone adopted these values and perceptions over time. To do so, a series of panel data analyses were conducted, focussing on FSE's assessment of economic fairness and of private enterprise as 
Bringing risk back in
'Risk' was brought back in to control for variations in the 'attraction' that working in a specific occupation may present. Research by Bonin et al. (2007) and Pollmann (2011) had shown an association between attitudes to risk and occupational choices. The authors found that people with more positive attitudes towards risk taking tended to select into occupations with higher levels of wage dispersion, which they interpreted as an indication of a greater readiness to work in a volatile and potentially insecure job environment. Introducing earnings risk thus helped to control for self-selection into these types of occupations, which may have been driven by a tolerance, acceptance or indeed expectation of risk -and commensurate reward.
Above all, the earnings dispersion variable helped to control for differences between occupations, which, on the basis of the above literature, should exert a matching pull on employment seekers with similar risk orientations and associated expectation from their job.
Following the above authors, a basic Mincer regression 3 (Mincer 1974 ) of the occupation-specific variance of earnings residuals was estimated in order to capture this volatility and, if indirectly, occupational risk. The resulting data were coded into a variable that identified occupations whose variance of the earnings residual was below, within or above one standard deviation of the mean of all occupations' residuals. It turned out that the earnings dispersion in the financial services occupations typically ranged within one standard deviation of the residual means, whilst about 10 per cent of employees had selected into occupations one standard deviation below the residual mean and a further 10 per cent had selected into occupations one standard deviation above the residual mean.
Time lag
A lag of the outcome variable of interest was introduced to account for the fact that past status is known to shape current status in most observed social phenomena. Introducing lagged variable meant that analyses drew other explanatory variable from just the last two occasions that they were observed. This resulted in a shrinking of the total number of data points to just under 13,000.
Highlighting the sector
Whilst our analyses so far focussed on FSE, as already noted, only about half of them were employed in the financial services sector. As this study was also and specifically concerned with identifying social orientations in the UK banking sector, a further variable was added to mark respondents' industrial sector of employment. 
Identifying FSE entrants

Findings I -economic fairness
The analysis of the economic fairness statement that 'ordinary people get their fair share of the nation's wealth' confirmed a strong association with sex, age and years spent with current employer (Table III , Model 1). All else equal, women were less likely than men to agree with that statement. Agreement with the statement also decreased with age, but increased with the time spent working with the same employer. In addition, variations in earnings dispersal were associated with perceptions of economic fairness. In comparison to people in occupations with below average wage dispersion, those in occupations with above average wage dispersion were more likely to agree with the statement. After taken these factors into account, employees not in financial services occupations were less likely than FSE to agree that the current system of wealth sharing was fair. Put another way, people in financial services occupations were more likely to believe that economic wealth was shared fairly in UK society.
<Table 3 about here>
The introduction of the lagged outcome variable and the industrial sector rendered the earnings dispersal indicator statistically non-significant, whilst reducing the level of significance of the occupation variable (Model 2). As expected, the lagged outcome variable was strongly positively associated with the current outcome variable, whilst the industrial sector variables revealed a greater propensity of those working in the financial sector to share a belief in the fairness of the UK socio-economic system.
As shown in Model 3 of Table 3 , there was no difference with respect to perceptions of fairness between recent entrants to financial services occupations and other employees.
Selection into financial services occupations therefore appeared not to be affected by a priori beliefs in the fairness of the UK's economic systems. Instead, socio-demographic characteristics and years spent with the same employer predominantly shaped and consolidated this fairness perception, although additional, if weaker, unexplained independent occupational and sectoral effects remained.
Findings II -attitudes to private enterprise
Similar associations involving socio-demographic, occupational and sectoral indicators were found for attitudes towards private enterprise. Model 1 again highlighted statistically significant differences with respect to sex and age, but lesser associations with years spent with employer (Table 4) . Women and those with more years with the same employer were less likely to identify with the statement, whereas identification increased, if slowly, with age. <Table 4 about here>
The receipt of a bonus payment in the previous 12 months was also inversely associated with agreement with the enterprise statement, as was wage dispersion although the statistical significance of that association was just outside the 5 per cent level. After taking these variables into account, management FSE were more and other employees less likely to agree with the enterprise statement than investment FSE were.
The addition of the lagged outcome variable and the industry sector variable in Model 2 lessened the statistical strength of the observed difference between occupations, whilst rendering bonus payment and wage dispersal non-significant. As before, the lagged outcomes variable was strongly positively associated with the current outcome variable. Employees in private and financial services were more likely than others to express confidence in private enterprise's capability to solve the UK's economic problems.
Adding the new entrant indicator into Model 3 had few effects on already observed statistical relationships, although it accentuated the prevalence of pro-enterprise attitudes among FSE compared with employees in other occupations. The statistical coefficient pertaining to the new entrant variable itself indicated a fairly strong, but inverse relationship between pro-enterprise perceptions and the entry into a financial services occupation. In other words, selection into financial services occupations was not driven by pro-enterprise preferences; if anything, the reverse was true. Instead, the articulation of these preferences was primarily a reflection of employment in the private sector and, in particular, as managerial FSE. Pro-enterprise perceptions did not become more prevalent with time spent with the same employer.
Discussion and conclusions
To summarise, the analyses confirmed that, in the run-up to the GFC, employees in financial services occupations and those working in the financial services sector were more inclined to express attitudes indicative of supporting current features of socio-economic justice and dominant economic principles in the UK than employees in other occupations. This was particularly apparent with respect to support for the economic fairness thesis. The association between FSE status and social attitudes was weaker with respect to orientations towards private enterprise, where the attitudinal divide cut across employment in production and public administration, on the one hand, and employment in services, including financial services, on the other hand.
Sharing these social attitudes was not necessarily associated with selection into financial occupations or the finance sector. The most consistent evidence pointed at employment duration or exposure to financial occupations and, more broadly, private services affecting employees' perceptions of economic fairness and the capacity of private enterprise to redress economic problems. In other words, institutionally-induced acculturation may be a more appropriate explanation for the prevalence among FSE of the perceptions examined here than pre-existing social preferences, in particular with respect to perceptions of economic fairness.
The evidence thus lends strongest support to the institutional-structural rather than the individual-behaviourist model of analysis. This conclusion complements the findings of Cohn, Fehr and Marechal's (2014) laboratory experiment, which showed that only when reminded of their professional status did bankers display dishonest behaviours in the gamebased experiment, whereas employees from other industries did not.
Social attitudes and the GFC: a case of tunnel vision?
When Toynbee and Walker (2008) spoke with London law partners and merchant bankers about the economics of effort and reward in high paying professions, they encountered blinkered perceptions of socio-economic privilege, a strong individualistic and conservative attitudes, and strongly articulated status defence. Their findings were published soon after Orton (2006) had reported on the reluctance of wealthy individuals interviewed in the English
Midlands to embrace active (local) citizenship as a practice fostering reciprocity and social cohesion, and Cowling and Harding's (2007) survey-based study that had found high income earners most inclined to accept social inequality. More recently, studies in psychology have found further evidence of a generic relationship between social class and (a lack of) generosity (Piff et al. 2010) and (a propensity to display un-) ethical behaviour (Piff et al. 2012 ). This evidence strongly points towards perceptual and behavioural class divides that, among those most privileged, undermine access to critical reflexivity that would have been required for a person to recognise their potential or actual role in the construction of the GFC.
In a similar vein, the present study has demonstrated that management FSE were particularly likely to express pro-enterprise attitudes, especially if they worked in the financial services sector. The importance of this finding is hard to underestimate given the role of management FSE in the GFC as the key decision-takers in corporate leadership positions.
Investment FSE may have driven profit, in the process bypassing the business's risk managers (Godechot 2007 , Ho 2009 
What to do?
Financial systems allowed to roam free in capitalism distort realities to suit their own agendas and prosperity. They "overvalue opportunities and underestimate risks in an effort to cope with the need to fulfil the expectation upon them" (Tuckett 2009: 3) . To do so, finance relies Financialisation and its tools, and the rewarding of high-leverage risk taking (Lapavitsas 2011 , Bebchuk & Sparmann 2009 ) have created dependencies, which make reform built on a voluntary (moral) readjustment of the sector seem unlikely and insufficient (Graafland & van de Ven 2011 While the scope for changing the social and political attitudes and corresponding actions that corporate banking appears to inculcate requires further study, resources ought also to be invested in containing the damaging influence of financial markets on society. This means, implementing some of the long-debated structural reforms that address the markets' exclusivist operational principles and corporate identities, working at various fronts.
In order to begin to dismantle the disproportionate influence of financial markets and their failures, bank activities would need to be isolated and refocussed. Banking, as has repeatedly been said, may again need to be 'boring', -or 'narrow' (Kay 2009 ). Splitting investment from retail bank may be one first step. However, banks ought also to be reformed internally, with backroom staff and human resource departments being given greater control and supervisory responsibility to ensure accountability at all levels of the business. Reform needs to redress the influence of both investment and management FSE.
The question of the political influence of finance also needs to be addressed.
Rebalancing economies from 'socially useless' (Turner 2009) to production that is socially useful is one critical component of this process, which may need to be done with banks in the role of supportive lenders, not speculating investors.
Notes
1 CRESC (2009) estimated that about 6.5 per cent of the UK workforce was employed in finance, including jobs in consultancy, accounting and law associated with the financial sector. Two per cent of investment FSE were self-employed. There were no self-employed management FSE in the sample. 
